Christians in Mecca

November 11th, 2007

Kudos to Tom Friedman today. I have had occasions to criticize him gently and less gently, here is a moment for congratulations.

He takes up the occasion of the Saudi King’s visit to the Vatican to underline reciprocity and freedom, and echoes what many feel around the world, and within Saudi Arabia, without daring to break the taboo.

Here was my take in a speech in Rome last April, published last week in Arabic for the benefit of Lebanese and Mideast Christians:

Generally, silence [towards the Christians’ plight in the ME] has led to more injustice. I have tended to defend victimized or threatened minorities through my life, Shi‘is or Kurds in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Jews in Lebanon and Iran, Palestinians in

Israel. At one point in Lebanese history, I did not think that Christians were victimized, quite the opposite, and I sided then with victimized Muslims and Palestinians who were ethnically cleansed from Christian areas. This is the more reason why I do not hesitate nowadays of taking up the plight of Christians, in Lebanon and the

Middle East. I believe that they are under threat, and that silence is not the right policy to reverse the trend, or correct the injustice. Nor are basic freedoms for Christians, as for Jews or Muslims, to be impaired without a sustained and open opposition to reverse them: one example is for me the ban in Saudi Arabia for Christians to visit Mecca and

Medina all year long. While an exception of sorts may be tolerated during the Hajj on account of the unique density and logistical problems resulting from the large influx of pilgrims, I do not think we should accept an all-year discrimination premised on the belief that Christians are ‘impure’ in the Holy cities. Indeed it was not the case in the cosmopolitan Hijaz, and the great scholar Snouck Hurgronje, like other travelers, has left us remarkable books on

Mecca, where he has sojourned for a full year at the end of the 19th century.
[1] Imagine if the Vatican or

Rome were suddenly decreed off bound to non-Catholics.



[1] See the pattern in J. Burkhardt, Travels in Arabia, London 1830; Burton, Personal narrative of a Pilgrimage to El Medina and Mecca, London, 1857; C Snouck Hurgronje, Mecca, mit Bilder Atlas, II, The Hague, 1888; id., Het Mekkanische Feest,

Leiden, 1888.

Blogs and subblogs: Rabelais Eliator, from Syria

November 11th, 2007

 

Sunday, November 11, 2007

 

On Eliator Mtanios, Rabelais from Damascus, Syria

 

As culture gets redrawn by technology — who doubts that Gutenberg’s invention of the printed book was the most important technological contribution of all times since the invention of writing ? –, we constantly ask ourselves how our mental world gets reshaped by such things as the internet, i-pods and video-blogs. 

 

Robert Fossaert offered somewhere in his Summa on La Société extraordinary remarks on this latest turn of technological events, and there was a recent column warning over the risk of emails — we are all familiar with the devastating effect of the wrong and overbearing ccs. Over lunch at Princeton last year, Paul Krugman, a colleague and celebrated columnist in the New York Times, provided yet another clue on the blog culture revolution, and readers of the present blog can hear an echo in my call for presidential candidates to devote some time everyday and connect with their electors through this unique means.

 

Krugman told the distinguished colleagues at LAPA that the inspiration for his columns — it’s really hard to have something to say twice a week — came from blog reading every day. He spends time in the morning on the more interesting blogs he knows, and finds the themes, outside conventional journalistic wisdom, that he weaves his columns around. Now he has started his own blog, surely a highly successful intellectual meeting place.

 

Which means a hierarchy of information: The New York Times prints all the news that it finds fit for its high-faluting level, and so shapes decision-making as the authoritative paper of the land. The way Washington decision-making operates, my good friend Prof Ruth Wedgwood was telling me last week, was by proxy. Press proxy that is, columns and op-eds in the Washington Post and in the NYT determine the flavour of the day. I was told once by Percy Kemp that president Bush had read one of my op-eds in the NYT on Iraq and expressed to his aides that it offered a better plan for Iraq than what they had come up with. As I vaguely recall, I had written, back in late 2003, that the US government should surrender sovereignty to the Iraqi Governing Council at once, and simply support it with security by taking the back seat. I wish I had confronted Mr Bremer with the information. I can read in his Memoirs now that the whole US government had backed that idea, and that he prevented it from happening in his earnest belief that he knew better than them and the Iraqis…

 

So there is a compelling hierarchy developing with columns, news items, blogs. Some of it is obvious: front page news in the Nahar would make my presidential bid so much stronger, and I am sorry Ghassan Tueni never weighed in, as I think he should professionally have, considering the unique coverage worldwide for my campaign, to allow this to happen against a coterie of mediocre territorial smotherer Nahar journalists who push each his own political agenda. My purpose today is not to comment on this hierarchy, but the way the traditional competition for newspaper coverage is being pushed around by the blog phenomenon.

 

This was prompted by my delight in reading some of these subblogs, namely comments on the page of Hizbullah’s Manar on the coverage of Walid Jumblat’s latest tv interview. Never mind what Jumblat had to say, and one had the usual outpouring of grief and hatred in the comments of Manar viewers – which do not seem to be monitored.

 

I sometimes read these blogs to find out about the quasi-uncensored mood that prevails in a given political group, and it’s highly instructive to see the subblogs/comments. What I did not expect, however, is to find myself irrepressibly laughing at the entry of one Eliator lady, from Syria, upon seeing the Manar suddenly featuring excerpts of Jumblat’s interview. If you scroll down that page, you’ll see two entries by Eliator Mtanios. [Here again is the excerpt] The first passage is entitled ‘I beg you protect the health and mind of people ‘

 

I do not know that I can translate it, and feel sorry for those who don’t read Arabic. To summarize it , this is a lady from Damascus, I think she is Christian (she studied with the ’sisters’), but she also says later she was drinking Matte, a hot infusion popular with Druzes who discovered it in South America, so maybe she’s Druze, but I doubt it considering her name.  So here she is sitting in her living room watching Manar. She had been so disgusted with news since the Hizbullah brave war against Israel was so adversely portrayed by Arab channels in the Gulf and Lebanon that she has all satellite tvs she doesn’t like blocked (’ciphered’, as she writes), to avoid precisely such shocking intrusion as Jumblat coming into her living room. Lo and behold, suddenly she beholds what she has been loathing and escaping, Jumblatt on tv. Her child starts crying, and as she protects him from listening, but can do little with her poor husband, ‘a very large man she can’t afford to lose’, who rolls back his eyes and is seized by a heart attack.

 

So Damascene Lady Eliator Mtanios now Qozma (she does not know whether she’ll be able to keep her double-barrelled marital name for long) is begging the Manar to warn good people like her from Jumblat’s sudden appearance in her television room: (’Please post some health warning, such as the ones we used to see near electric grids’.)

 

People answered variously, and so comments follow, including from a woman in Tartous, Northern Syria, and so Mrs Mtanios reacts again. This time, it takes half the contribution to know what she’s talking about, a great effective raconteur device which reminds me of the Maqamat genre in the high classical age, which is a bizarre animal she saw at a Matte-drinking friend in Tartous. Suddenly, as she is wondering aloud, she realised it reminded her of the dishevelled cockerel-like Jumblat. Delightful. I’ll send it to Walid bey.

 

My repeated apologies to the reader who doesn’t know Arabic, but it is as difficult to translate into English as would Seinfeld’s Qozma to Arab tv viewers.

 

There is a dark side, of course, with all these calls for Jumblat’s assassination in the comments. I don’t want to ruin this entry with that tragic aspect of unfolding Lebanese history, I’ll stop here.

 

 

‘Commending’ non-democrats

October 25th, 2007

The UN Secretary General’s report on Res. 1559 has just been released. It is decent, diplomatic, and non sequitur in the original sense. Pretty useless, encouraging Lebanese to love each other and get on with the presidency. I suppose it’s in the right order of things, for the UN apparatchiks to say nothing. It irks, however, when a full paragraph is devoted to ‘commending’ the Lebanese Speaker for his great efforts at reconciliation. This is the very Speaker who presided over countless constitutional amendements ‘for the one and only time’ to prevent democratic change in the presidency, and continues to block the elections after closing the House for a full year.

Other irksome issue, those visits of foreign dignitaries, with no result and no end in sight. Latest is the arrival of the Egyptian foreign minister. President Mubarak has been in power longer than any Egyptian ruler in history, including the Pharaohs, but two, and has Ayman Nur in jail for two years for daring to challenge him in the last presidential election forced onto him by the Cedar Revolution and its echo on Cairo’s streets. So his foreign minister will be in town tomorrow to teach the Lebanese how to democratically choose their president. There will be many in Lebanon to ‘commend’ him for his visit.

It can get worse, I suppose, and the emissary of the Sudanese president continues to threaten us with a visit to get Lebanon right.

I must say I am disappointed with our Prime Minister, he does not set the tone where it should be. He is a polite man. How about saying he is too busy to meet with them ?

Another missed constitutional occasion

October 23rd, 2007

Under the Constitution, to allow a decent and orderly passage of power from one era to another, a month at least separates the election of the new president from his (or her hopefully one day) taking over his responsibilities. This democratic peg has now been lost. Instead of seeing a full month of debates in Parliament by declared candidates, nothing but tension happened, and with the passing of the normal constitutional cut-off date, tension will grow each day against a hardening of positions.

This riding roughshod over basics is the more humiliating since Parliament met last week to choose committee heads. Now the next session is announced for November 12. The only sure thing for history is that the contest for the new presidency, whomever it may rest on (including me), will have not been minimally democratic.

At least there are declared candidates, four of them who have done so openly and consistently (even if the last two decided to embark on a limited campaign only in the past month). Looking at the proverbial glass with some optimism, it was ten per cent full thanks to the ‘declared candidacy’ as a new democratic phenomenon in the country.

It is unfortunate, and characteristically undemocratic, to see other names continuing to be bandied about. But scheming and conspiratorial habits die hard.

Parliament’s eerie meeting

October 16th, 2007

The Speaker has called for a meeting of Parliament to elect some administrative officials tomorrow. Poor Lebanese Constitution, yet again defaced with trivialities. It could not be more tragic. At a time when MPs are called in by Article 75 of the Constitution to meet and do nothing else but elect the president, the Speaker, who closed the House for a full year, is having it reopen to do something else than what the whole world is expecting it to do.

One would denounce it if it were worth it.

‘Middle Eastern Leadership’- Axess Magazine

October 13th, 2007

Axess Magazine 

AXESS Axess-blomman INTERVIEW

Middle-Eastern Leadership

INTERVIEW | The Lebanese law professor Chibli Mallat has chosen the path of politics instead of remaining a pure academic. He has been involved in the opposition to Saddam Hussein, as well as in attempts to get Ariel Sharon indicted. He is also running a campaign to become elected president of Lebanon.

Translated by Phil Holmes

One sunny afternoon I am cycling to the campus to meet my neighbour and university colleague Chibli Mallat in the idyllic university town of Princeton. We are there under what at first appearance seem to be similar circumstances. He is, like my wife, a Visiting Fellow at Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School. We both live down by the artificial lake which the industrial magnate Andrew Carnegie once donated to Princeton, so that its students could practise rowing on terms which were befitting their exalted status and ambitions. But Mallat’s existential situation is essentially different from mine and from most of the other people at Princeton.

He gives me an essay he has just written, about how difficult it is to be far away from your country and nevertheless remain committed politically and socially. The tone is sad—about the distance, about the fact that developments in his home country are once again being written in blood and tears. As he writes in one of his books: “The Middle East has been cruel to my generation.” Most of his schoolmates are dispersed around the world in a more or less self-imposed exile. There they have admittedly often had great personal successes. But at the same time they are lost to their home countries and the region which desperately needs precisely their talents and expertise in order to extricate itself from the vicious circle of violence and oppression. Yet others have fallen victim to one or other of the bloody conflicts and power struggles which at regular intervals have afflicted the Middle East: civil wars, occupations, plots, terrorist attacks, the repressive violence of many dictatorships against their own citizens.”

MALLAT IS FROM Lebanon, where he is professor of law at the Université Saint-Joseph in Beirut. He has also worked as a guest professor at a series of prestigious seats of learning in the West. What is more, he is generally known as a leading human rights activist in the Middle East. His academic expertise is Islamic law from a comparative perspective, a field within which he has written a number of books and articles. For a long time he has fought for democracy and a state governed by law in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. Even in the early 1980s he became deeply involved in the opposition to Saddam Hussein. At the beginning of the 90s he helped found the International Committee for the Liberation of Iraq. In 1996 he set up Indict, an organisation whose aim was to gather together proof of Saddam’s crimes which could later be used in court.

In the struggle against Saddam, he allied himself with Ahmed Chalabi and the other Iraqi exiles who, keenly cheered on by neo-con ideologues such as Paul Wolfowitz, succeeded in getting the American Congress to adopt the so-called Iraqi Liberation Act in 1998. One consequence of this cooperation is that he is, in certain political camps, reputed to be an all-too devoted supporter of Bush’s Iraq policy. On the other hand he is also known as one of those jurists who has led the attempts, hardly popular in Washington, to get the former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon indicted before a Belgian court for his role in the massacres in 1982 in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila.

He also played a leading role in the Lebanese “Cedar Revolution,” the great demonstrations after the murder of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who in 2005 forced Syria to leave Lebanon, a land they had occupied since the end of the Lebanese civil war. It was against the background of his involvement in this political movement that he, at the beginning of 2006, began his campaign to be elected president of Lebanon. The war between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006 has, however, led to a political paralysis in Lebanon. Today civil war threatens to break out once again, and a peaceful and open presidential election seems remote.

When one considers that political activism in this part of the world is often associated with mortal danger I wonder why he came to choose the course of politics rather than remain a pure academic. Mallat thinks that the reason was that his discipline, law, is so close to immediate solid, political realities. It was not possible for him in the long run to maintain the distinction between the academic study of law, democracy and human rights on the one hand and the practical struggle for these rights on the other. “If one lives in a country like Lebanon, one observes that human rights and justice are not merely an abstract question,” he notes wrily.

AT THE SAME time the path from the professorial study to the politics of the street was both long and crooked. Mallat, who belongs to a prominent Maronite family in Lebanon, took the first step from academic life into public debate by writing columns for daily papers and appearing as a commentator on radio and TV. Both his expertise on factual matters and his home base in the politically important Maronite community were important in this respect. In Lebanese politics religious adherence is of decisive significance, and the country’s fragile stability is based on a well-established practice which, among other things, by custom reserves the presidency for a Maronite, a Christian community with its roots in Lebanon since the seventh century.

But it was not primarily internal politics which initially attracted Mallat. Its focus on human rights led by definition away from the frontiers of his own nation. In a region where the villains and tyrants are many he came to focus on Saddam and Sharon. In the one case he aimed at an Arab dictator who with particular force symbolised the lack of democracy in the Arab world. In the other case he devoted himself to an Israeli leader who symbolised oppression of the Palestinians, whose struggle for national liberation from the colonial yoke was still not complete. But, according to Mallat, it is in both cases a question ultimately of the same struggle. “I have two guiding principles,” he says. “One is the struggle for human rights, the other is non-violence as a means for promoting this movement.”

But, explains Mallat, the tactics vary. In the case of Sharon it was a great help to use the media and world opinion, to be as visible as possible so as to apply pressure as effectively as possible. With Saddam it was different; in that case a more subtle approach behind the scenes was required. Saddam was not merely a dangerous man. As a dictator he was less worried about what the indigenous population or the international community thought. For that reason it was less likely he would be swayed by a mass media campaign.

The great turning point for Mallat was, however, the revolutionary events of 2005 in connection with the murder of Hariri. “It was no longer possible for me to remain in the background,” he says. “Gradually we were losing ground politically; colleagues and friends were being killed. I could no longer tolerate merely being a passive observer. It was more important than ever to act. It was not sufficient to be a critical intellectual, I felt. I also wanted to multiply my personal strength by speaking for and with other people.”

RUNNING A PRESIDENTIAL campaign in the way that Mallat does is, however, something quite new in Lebanon. The president is not elected directly by the people but by a vote in parliament. What is more, the choice of candidates is made from within a narrow circle of influential Maronites. Mallat has chosen instead to run an open campaign with his own home page on the internet and speeches and writings directed at the entire Lebanese people, not just an inner circle of the country’s elite. But in order to be elected he must also, in a traditional way, convince a majority both within his own religious group and in parliament.

“Our practice is that it is only Maronites, not even other Christians, who can be considered for the presidency. I would like to change that tradition; for me the most important thing is that I am a Lebanese, not that I am a Maronite. But only if I have sufficient power and influence can I work effectively for such a radical change in our constitution.”

I wonder, when one considers that Lebanon is faced with the threat of a civil war, what status his presidential campaign has now, in the summer of 2007? “Since the war in the summer of 2006 the political situation has become so blocked that parliament does not even meet. This means that a new presidential election cannot be contemplated just now. In this sense my election campaign is also in a timeout situation, even if I continue working to get ready for the moment when the situation changes. I am publishing two new books to this end, one about the Cedar Revolution, one with speeches and writings which relate to my campaign.”

To what extent can this change be accelerated by western countries, I ask. These countries have, since the end of the Second World War, in principle adopted two positions as regards pressures aiming to promote democratic developments in countries with authoritarian regimes. The USA has often chosen a harder line, with political demands backed up by military threats and an actual readiness to take up arms. Iraq may be a poor advert for this attitude, but the defenders of the USA can also point to positive examples, such as the fall of the Soviet Union and the short Kosovo war.

In Europe we have preferred to use diplomacy as far as possible. We have cajoled with advantageous financial treaties rather than beating the war drum. Not least the establishment of the EU in the shadow of the Second World War, and its subsequent expansion, offers a number of proofs that this strategy can be successful. The EU is an organisation which today comprises a number of countries who not too long ago were communist vassal states or had military dictatorships or other authoritarian systems.

FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE I wonder how Mallat views the EU’s role today, when American efforts in the Middle East seem to be grinding to a halt. Can the EU play a positive role in a similar way as they have done in relation to other Mediterranean countries, such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus and to a certain extent Turkey?

“Let me begin with a provocative statement,” he says. “The conflict between Israel and the Arab countries cannot be solved before Israel, Lebanon and Palestine are part of Europe. What do I mean by that? Europe is enormously important. Purely geographically, of course, in its capacity as a close neighbour—since Cyprus became a member, the EU has actually had a frontier with Lebanon. But above all as we in the Middle East need a catalyst, a mighty vision which is both original and humanist enough to dissolve our deep conflicts. And that idea is Europe. How that is to be achieved is a different matter, but I am sure that we will not achieve peace until we have created a structure within the framework of which Lebanon and Israel find a place in Europe.”

The idea of the EU as a combined motor for peace and growth has, of course, a large measure of credibility from a historical perspective, at the same time it is also the case that the desire for expansion to date seems to be limited, at least as regards the Muslim countries. If Turkey’s application has now met with opposition what hope can there be for Lebanon?

Mallat nods sadly and admits that many, perhaps, most Europeans are tired of expansion, immigration and diversity. But, he adds immediately, the inclusive structure he is indicating does not need to imply formal membership. “I take as my starting point Romano Prodi’s brilliant idea from 2002, what he called the ‘politics of neighbourhood.’ The idea is to admit countries in the EU’s immediate vicinity, provide them with the opportunity of participating in “the European dream” at the same time as they in their turn respect a certain limitation in their association with the EU. They would be offered almost everything except formal membership and full participation in the purely political institutions: access to structural funds, coordination of the financial system, gradual opportunity for immigration, etc. That is the key. If the Palestinian refugees claim the right to migration and work, a large part of the problem would be on its way to being solved.

“On the other hand, an arrangement of this kind would take into account Europeans’ understandable anxiety at the idea of full membership. The problem has to do with population numbers—not merely the fear of drowning in a flood of immigration, but also the concern at losing democratic control. And hand on heart: what would Israel or Lebanon gain from being able to vote in Brussels that they do not already have through an association? Just look at Norway! They would in time be given a status similar to that of Lichtenstein now. I think this too would be a form which would suit Turkey better than full membership. Turkey would be able to retain its national institutions, and the EU would avoid a divisive debate on whether Turkey really qualifies as a European country.”

MALLAT THINKS THAT Europe represents several stages of hope. The final hope is to solve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, but before this happens people hope that the EU can create a firm structure promoting economic development and democratic reforms.

“What we in Lebanon’s civilian society demand of Europe in the first stage is that you quite simply exist here, but you are present with your eyes and voices. When, in 2005, we had our first free parliamentary elections for 30 years, you were here. When, now, it is time to choose a new president we hope and pray that you will again be on site. Not to support Mallat as as a candidate—that would crush my chances—but to support free debate and true democracy.”

But, I cannot resist asking, how does he see the opportunity of realising his dream if he takes off his visionary political hat and puts on his critical academic hat?

Mallat chuckles and admits that in this capacity he is, of course, a tad more pessimistic. “Beyond the positive direction—Prodi’s ‘politics of proximity’—I see several negative dimensions. The American presence in Israel would not let the EU in as long as they can rely on the USA’s power. There is the EU’s internal crisis after the referendums on the constitution in France and Holland, even if the new treaty negotiated during the Merkel summer of 2007 provides some renewed hope in this respect. And finally, there is the extremism that has taken root in the Muslim world and which has also been given violent expression in Europe.”

What role, I ask, is played by Arab nationalism and in particular the choice of violence as a political method? You mentioned earlier that your guiding principles are human rights and non-violence. I have often wondered why non-violence has not been adopted as a strategy in Palestine. Gandhi taught the world that non-violence works best precisely in the struggle against a democracy—like Israel—rather than in the struggle against more ruthless authoritarian regimes. It feels, tragically, like a “road not taken.”

“This is a difficult and extremely serious question,” he replies. “I have pleaded for a strategy of that kind myself. Gandhi is unfortunately an exception in the history of national freedom movements. More typical and relevant for the struggle of the Arabs was the terrible war of liberation in Algeria in which hundreds of thousands of people died. Gandhi was exceptional—and I cannot compare myself with him even if I regard him as a great inspiration. Him and Mandela. But how many Gandhis and Mandelas can we hope for? And not even Mandela rejected violence as a political instrument.”

I WONDER WHETHER Mallat believes that the Americans and those who supported their intervention in Iraq underestimated nationalism as a political force. Most people do not, despite everything, want their country to be occupied, even if it happens in the name of democracy and human rights. This was a lesson which perhaps should have been learnt definitively after the Vietnam war. This applies especially to those so-called liberal hawks who were not driven by a regard for purely national interests, but simply wanted to promote human rights. Has a tragic victim of the catastrophic Iraq war been the offensive struggle for human rights?

“I believe that I underestimated the nationalist dimension. Of course, I was against the invasion even if I was for the fall of Saddam. And when the invasion was a fact, I wished it to be concluded as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, I did not understand how strongly and deeply the nationalist resistance would become. And bearing in mind how wrong I, and many others, were on this issue of the nationalist response, I now hesitate to predict the future.”

Mallat at the same time notes that even if the Iraq war shows problems in military interventions, the question remains nevertheless as to what we can and should do in cases such as Rwanda, Darfur and Zimbabwe. Pure passivity cannot be our only alternative. It must be possible to legitimise some mixture of military threats and promises of help within a framework of a multilateral action.

“For me, however,” he concludes, “the most important thing is that we achieve a success story which can serve as an example in the Middle East. So far there is no example of this kind, even if Lebanon to some extent was on the way to becoming such a success story for a couple of months. We need more, something which is lasting, like Spain and Portugal after the fall of their dictatorships and their entry into the EU. The most likely candidates in my part of the world are Morocco and Lebanon. Lebanon with its modest but nevertheless real experience of non-violence. At least if we get an honourable, powerful and democratically elected president.”

End

LARS TRÄGÅRDH

All Rights Reserved.


A Vatican moment

October 11th, 2007

The last time I saw the Maronite Patriarch, earlier this Summer, I sought to encourage him to energetically arbitrate the presidential election. He was skeptical, and I could understand his reticence, but I thought the situation was so grave as to warrant exceptional measures. I was hoping, together with encouragements to the EU, French academic colleagues, and the media, that a democratic atmosphere could be created by multiplying fora of discussions. None of these fora materialised formally, and I do not think Bkerke will. The Constitution does not regulate the competition over the presidency, and it is hard to see how any contender can be bound in the absence of rules.

Still, the situation is grave, and particularly so for the Christians of Lebanon, and beyond them, of the Middle East. Back in April, I was the guest of an active Catholic organisation close to the Vatican. It was an occasion to express to Mgr Antonio Veglio, the Secretary of the Near Eastern Catholic Churches, whom I hold in great respect since my discussions with him in Beirut where he served as Nuncio, the gravity of the situation. I like to think that the Vatican took this alarm bell seriously, and that its active diplomacy since was in part at least the result of this insistence.

Together with this entreaty, I sought to develop in a more comprehensive manner some themes I had occasionally addressed in my campaign.

Here is the speech.

Comments, + a modest suggestion to fellows on the campaign trail

October 10th, 2007

Apologies for not posting or reacting to comments. It is just a matter of time, and I am not being able to respond or manage the comments received. And I can’t allow free comments, this is a blog I hope will be taken seriously, and would rather not have to worry about the inevitable abuses, even if rare.

Which brings me to a suggestion for my colleagues running for president in their respective countries:  a blog is an extraordinary democratic means to share with the public the matters which matter to you mostly, and which the press will always distort however well-meaning and faithful to your speeches. So Ms Clinton, Mr Obama, Mr McCain, please offer blogs, and write them yourselves so that people know exactly what matters to you beyond the media hype and its distortive lens. It takes one hour or so a day, time far better used than the nauseating Iowa and other repetitive stumping.

Fellow presidential candidate Mallat, from tiny Lebanon.

Demeaning «suffrage universel for the presidency»

October 10th, 2007

Under this title, my presidential program features “bringing up our democratic system to the next degree of democratic maturation: people voting directly for the presidency of the executive branch.” I believe in the direct voting in office by the people for their leaders. The ‘menu’ offered by Hasan Nasrallah last week has trivialized this important issue both by proposing it under the abhorrent ‘one and only time’ constitutional amendment, and by listing it next to some cuckoo-land opinion polls’ mechanism. I was already tempted to respond last year when Michel Aoun put it forward as a deus ex machina solution that would overcome his minoritarian position in Parliament, but I resisted the temptation on account of the lack of seriousness in which it was uttered.

Now this proposal of course cannot work politically, which would send the presidential election, which has already been frustrated for a full three years, into yet another open deadline. The ploy is simple: since we will not accept the majority in Parliament, they essentially say, let’s find another system. Forgive me this example, because the parallel is somewhat excessive so outrageous and brutal Qaddafi’s rule, but we have often heard his advocacy of a democratic Palestine expressed by the Libyan dictator. I generally share this view of the needed future of Israel-Palestine, and have recently disagreed with Noam Chomsky over it (Presidential Talk, p.34), but it’s disheartening that a matter that requires so much joint work, build up, dedication and sacrifice for a federal, egalitarian Israel-Palestine would be demeaned by Qaddafi under his ‘Isratine’ shallow concept.

This same demeaning of a key issue, universal suffrage, is taking place now. First, one cannot make a change for one and the only time. This is simply a pre-democratic view. Law is there to stay. Rules cannot be changed at the last moment to accommodate one’s political ambitions, especially when used presently to frustrate the majority in Parliament which is perceived to be on the other side –and remember that during the 2005 elections the configuration was diametrically opposite, and, more importantly, that Parliament was elected freely for the first time since 1972.

I find it abnormal, – “a 19th century system of notables,” I wrote in my short treatise in 1998 — that deputies choose the head(s) of the executive branch, and believe it’s much more appropriate to ask the citizen to cast their vote for him or her. So when a direct vote for the presidency is advocated by my campaign, we need to underline presidency. In Lebanon it’s dual, and on top of this, it’s sectarian. Would then the presidency be a Maronite-Sunni ticket ? If that’s the case, what remains of the legitimacy of the Shi’i Speaker ? Very little, because he will not have been chosen by the people. So should one also elect the Speaker directly by the people ? This is a thought, but then Parliament might have a Speaker to whom the majority in Parliament is opposed. What will he then do ? A constitution is a whole, one can’t just change a little piece here and there, it simply doesn’t work.

Electing the head(s) of the executive branch is an important, central issue, so central indeed that in our before last meeting the Maronite Patriarch was attentive to my platform’s emphasis on it. I explained that put in such sort of populist, if not putschist terms, a proposal so momentous can only spell disaster. But I am not prepared to abandon it. We need to discuss it seriously, together with other issues to reduce sectarianism in our system. This specific issue is a world issue, I believe, and I deliberately chose an invitation to Harvard Law School to develop it in a world context, because the Middle East is questioning constitutional theory the world over, and this is very much part of it.

We should not abandon the idea of universal suffrage for the head(s) of our executive branch, and I do not agree with some of the kneejerk reaction heard in response to Nasrallah. But we mostly should not demean that important and needed reform in the way he did. If we want to talk about it seriously, in Lebanon, in Iraq, or in Israel, it requires a serious Constitutional Convention. And a new, democratically elected president first under the Lebanese Constitution.

Meanwhile, in Sweden

October 8th, 2007

My good friend, renowned sociologist and historian Lars Tragardh, has just published this longish interview and portrait he meticulously developed through our stay last year in Princeton. I understand Axess is the equivalent of the New York Review of Books in the US, and of Le Nouvel Obs in France.

I don’t understand a single word, but my Swedish friends surely do. Arabic and English translations to follow shortly.

 

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Mellanöstern behöver en

mäktig vision

Den libanesiske juridikprofessorn Chibli Mallat har valt politikens väg i stället för att förbli en renodlad akademiker. Han har varit engagerad i oppositionen mot Saddam Hussein, liksom i försöken att få Ariel Sharon åtalad. Han bedriver också en kampanj för att bli vald till Libanons president.

Av Lars Trägårdh

Lars Trägårdh är historiker och samhällsforskare.

En solig eftermiddag cyklar jag till campus för att träffa min granne och akademikerkollega, Chibli Mallat, i den idylliska universitetsstaden Princeton. Vi är där under vad som vid första påseende ser ut som liknande omständigheter. Han är, likt min hustru, en Visiting Fellow vid Princetons Woodrow Wilson School. Vi bor båda nere vid den konstgjorda sjö som industrimagnaten Andrew Carnegie en gång donerade till Princeton så att dess studenter skulle kunna träna rodd på villkor som var i samklang med deras exalterade status och stora ambitioner i övrigt. Men Mallats existentiella situation är väsensskild från min och de allra flesta andras i Princeton.Han ger mig en essä han just har skrivit - om hur svårt det är att vara långt borta från sitt land och ändå förbli engagerad politiskt och socialt. Tonen är sorgsen - över avståndet, över att utvecklingen i hemlandet åter är skriven i blod och tårar. Som han skriver i en av sina böcker: ”Mellanöstern har varit grym mot min generation.” De flesta av hans skolkamrater är spridda runt världen i en mer eller mindre självvald exil. Där har de visserligen ofta haft stora personliga framgångar. Men samtidigt har de gått förlorade för sina hemländer och en region som desperat behöver just deras talanger och expertis för att komma ur den onda cirkeln av våld och förtryck. Åter andra har fallit offer för någon av alla de blodiga konflikter och maktkamper som med jämna mellanrum hemsökt Mellanöstern: inbördeskrig, ockupationer, komplotter, terroristattacker, de många diktaturernas repressiva våld mot de egna medborgarna.Mallat är från Libanon där han är professor i juridik på Université Saint-Joseph i Beirut. Han har även arbetat som gästprofessor vid en rad prestigefyllda lärosäten i västvärlden. Dessutom är han allmänt känd som en ledande människorättsaktivist i Mellanöstern. Hans akademiska expertis är islamisk lagstiftning i ett jämförande perspektiv, ett område inom vilket han skrivit en rad böcker och artiklar. Sedan länge har han kämpat för demokrati och rättsstat i såväl Libanon som Palestina och Irak. Redan under 80-talets början blev han djupt engagerad i oppositionen mot Saddam Hussein. I början av 90-talet var han med om att grunda den Internationella kommittén för ett fritt Irak. År 1996 startade han Indict, en organisation vars syfte var att samla ihop bevis för Saddams brott som senare kunde användas i domstol.I kampen mot Saddam var han lierad med Ahmed Chalabi och de andra exilirakier som livligt påhejade av neokonservativa ideologer som Paul Wolfowitz lyckades få den amerikanska kongressen att klubba igenom den så kallade Iraqi Liberation Act år 1998. En konsekvens av detta samarbete är att han i vissa politiska läger fått rykte om sig att vara en alltför hängiven anhängare av Bushs Irakpolitik. Å andra sidan är han även känd som en av de jurister som ledde försöken, näppeligen populära i Washington, att få den israeliska premiärministern Ariel Sharon åtalad inför en belgisk domstol för sin roll i massakrerna 1982 i de palestinska flyktinglägren Sabra och Shatila.Till toppen

HAN SPELADE OCKSÅ en ledande roll i den libanesiska ”cederrevolutionen”, de stora demonstrationerna efter mordet på premiärminister Rafik Hariri som 2005 tvingade Syrien att lämna Libanon, ett land som man hade ockuperat sedan slutet på det libanesiska inbördeskriget. Det var mot bakgrund av hans engagemang i denna politiska rörelse som han i början av 2006 påbörjade sin kampanj för att bli vald till Libanons president. Kriget mellan Israel och Hizbollah sommaren 2006 har dock lett till en politisk förlamning i Libanon. Idag hotar inbördeskriget att bryta ut igen och ett fredligt och öppet presidentval tycks fjärran.Med tanke på att politisk aktivism i denna del av världen ofta är förknippad med fara för livet undrar jag varför han kom att välja politikens väg istället för att förbli en renodlad akademiker.Mallat menar att skälet var att hans disciplin, juridik, ligger så nära konkreta, politiska realiteter. Det var inte möjligt för honom att i längden upprätthålla gränsdragningen mellan det akademiska studiet av lag, demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter, å ena sidan, och den praktiska kampen för dessa rättigheter, å den andra. ”Lever man i ett land som Libanon blir man hela tiden varse att mänskliga rättigheter och rättvisa inte enbart är ett abstrakt spörsmål”, noterar han lakoniskt.Samtidigt var vägen från professorns kammare till gatans politik både lång och krokig. Mallat, som tillhör en framstående maronitisk familj i Libanon, tog först steget från akademin till offentlig debatt genom att skriva krönikor för dagstidningar och uppträda som kommentator i radio och tv. Både hans expertis i sakfrågor och hans hemort i det politiskt viktiga maronitiska samfundet var här viktiga. I libanesisk politik är religiös tillhörighet av avgörande betydelse, och landets bräckliga stabilitet bygger på en praxis som bland annat av hävd reserverar presidentskapet för en maronit, ett kristet samfund med rötter i Libanon sedan 600-talet.Men det var inte först och främst inrikespolitik som till en början attraherade Mallat. Hans fokus på mänskliga rättigheter ledde definitionsmässigt bortom den egna nationens gränser. I en region där bovarna och tyrannerna är många, kom han att fokusera på Saddam och Sharon.I det ena fallet tog han sikte på en arabisk diktator som med speciell kraft symboliserade arabvärldens brist på demokrati. I det andra fallet inriktade han sig på en israelisk ledare som symboliserade förtrycket av palestinierna, vars kamp för nationell befrielse från det koloniala oket ännu var ofullbordad. Men enligt Mallat handlar det i båda fallen ytterst om samma kamp:- Jag har två ledstjärnor. Det ena är striden för mänskliga rättigheter, den andra är ickevåld som medlet för denna rörelse.Men, förklarar Mallat, taktiken blev olika. I fallet Sharon var det till stor hjälp att använda media och världsopinion, att vara så synlig som möjligt för att så effektivt som möjligt utöva påtryckningar. Med Saddam var det annorlunda, i det fallet krävdes en mer subtil ansats bakom kulisserna. Saddam var inte bara en farlig man; som diktator var han mindre bekymrad av vad den inhemska befolkningen eller det internationella samfundet tyckte och tänkte. Därför var det mindre troligt att han skulle påverkas av en massmedial kampanj.

Till toppenDEN STORA VÄNDPUNKTEN för Mallat var dock de revolutionära händelserna 2005 i samband med mordet på Hariri.- Det var inte längre möjligt för mig att stanna kvar i bakgrunden. Efter hand förlorade vi mark politiskt, till slut dödades kollegor och vänner. Jag stod inte längre ut med att enbart vara en passiv åskådare. Det var viktigare än någonsin att agera, det räckte inte att vara en kritisk intellektuell, kände jag. Jag ville också multiplicera min personliga styrka genom att tala för och med andra.Att bedriva en presidentkampanj på det sätt som Mallat gör är dock något helt nytt i Libanon. Presidenten väljs inte direkt av folket utom genom omröstning i parlamentet. Dessutom görs valet av kandidater inom en snäv cirkel av inflytelserika maroniter.Mallat har valt att i stället driva en öppen kampanj, med egen hemsida på nätet och tal och skrifter riktade mot hela det libanesiska folket, inte bara en inre krets av landets elit. Men för att bli vald måste han även, på traditionellt vis, övertyga en majoritet både inom sin egen religiösa grupp och inom parlamentet.- Vår praxis är den att bara maroniter, inte ens andra kristna, kan komma ifråga för presidentskapet. Jag skulle vilja ändra på denna tradition: för mig är det viktigaste att jag är libanes, inte att jag är maronit. Men bara om jag har nog makt och inflytande kan jag arbeta effektivt för en så radikal förändring av vår konstitutionella ordning.Jag undrar, med tanke på att Libanon åter står inför hotet av ett inbördeskrig, vilken status hans presidentkampanj har nu, sommaren 2007.- Sedan kriget sommaren 2006 är det politiska läget så låst att parlamentet över huvud taget inte möts. Detta innebär också att ett nyval av president inte kan komma ifråga just nu. I denna bemärkelse befinner sig även min valkampanj i en timeout-situation, även om jag arbetar vidare för att vara beredd och till förfogande i det ögonblick som situationen förändras. Denna höst ger jag ut två nya böcker i detta syfte, en om cederrevolutionen, en med tal och skrifter som knyter an till min kampanj.I vilken mån kan denna förändring påskyndas av västländerna, frågar jag. Dessa har sedan andra världskrigets slut i princip intagit två positioner vad det gäller påtryckningar i syfte att befrämja den demokratiska utvecklingen i länder med auktoritära regimer.USA har ofta valt en tuffare linje, med politiska krav som varit uppbackade av militära hot och en faktisk villighet att ta till vapen. Irak må vara mindre bra reklam för denna hållning, men USA:s försvarare kan även peka på positiva exempel som Sovjetunionens fall och det korta Kosovokriget.I Europa har man överlag föredragit att använda diplomati i möjligaste mån. Man har lockat med fördelaktiga ekonomiska fördrag snarare än att slå på stridstrumman. Inte minst EU:s grundande i skuggan av andra världskriget och dess utvidgning därefter erbjuder en mängd bevis på att denna strategi kan vara lyckosam. EU är en organisation som idag omfattar en rad länder som för inte så länge sedan var kommunistiska lydstater eller löd under militärdiktaturer och andra auktoritära system.

Till toppenI DETTA PERSPEKTIV undrar jag hur Mallat ser på EU:s roll idag, när den amerikanska ansatsen i Mellanöstern tycks ha gått rejält i stå. Kan EU spela en positiv roll på ett liknande sätt som man har gjort i förhållande till andra Medelhavsländer, som Grekland, Spanien, Portugal, Cypern och, i viss mån, Turkiet?- Låt mig starta med ett provokativt påstående: konflikten mellan Israel och arabländerna kan inte lösas förrän Israel, Libanon och Palestina är del av Europa. Vad menar jag med detta? Europa är oerhört viktigt. Rent geografiskt, givetvis, i egenskap av en nära granne - efter att Cypern har blivit medlem så delar EU idag faktiskt gräns med Libanon. Men framför allt då vi i Mellanöstern behöver en förlösande idé, en mäktig vision som är både originell och humanistisk nog för att kunna lösa upp våra djupa konflikter. Och denna idé är Europa. Hur detta ska åstadkommas är en annan sak, men jag är säker på att vi inte kommer att uppnå fred förrän vi skapat en struktur inom ramen för vilken Libanon och Israel finner en plats i Europa.Tanken på EU som en kombinerad freds- och tillväxtmotor har visserligen ett stort mått av trovärdighet i ett historiskt perspektiv, men samtidigt är det också så att viljan till expansion idag tycks vara begränsad, inte minst vad det gäller muslimska länder. Om Turkiets ansökan nu stött på patrull, vilket hopp kan det finnas för Libanon?Mallat nickar sorgset och tillstår att många, kanske de flesta européer, är trötta på expansion, invandring och mångfald. Men, tillägger han direkt, den inkluderande struktur han syftar på behöver inte innebära ett formellt medlemskap:- Jag tar avstamp i Romano Prodis briljanta idé från 2002, den han kallade ”politics of neighborhood” (grannskapspolitik). Tanken är att släppa in länderna i EU:s närområde; ge dem möjlighet att ta del av ”the European dream” samtidigt som de i sin tur respekterar en viss begränsning i associationen till EU. De skulle erbjudas nästan allt utom det formella medlemskapet och full delaktighet i de rent politiska institutionerna: tillgång till strukturfonder, samordning av det ekonomiska systemet, stegvis möjlighet till immigration, med mera. Detta är nyckeln. Skulle de palestinska flyktingarna få rätt till migration och arbete så skulle en stor del av problemet vara på väg att lösas.- Å andra sidan skulle ett sådant arrangemang ta hänsyn till européernas förståeliga ängslan inför tanken på ett fullt medlemskap. Problemet har att göra med befolkningstal - inte bara rädslan i att drunkna i en flod av invandring utan även oron över att förlora den demokratiska kontrollen. Och handen på hjärtat: Vad skulle Israel eller Libanon tjäna på att kunna rösta i Bryssel som de inte redan skulle få via en association? Se bara på Norge! De skulle med tiden få en status liknande den som Lichtenstein nu har. Jag tror även detta vore en form som skulle passa Turkiet bättre än ett fullt medlemskap: Turkiet skulle kunna behålla sina nationella institutioner, och EU skulle slippa en uppslitande debatt om huruvida Turkiet verkligen platsar som ett ”europeiskt” land.

Till toppenMALLAT MENAR ATT Europa representerar flera stadier av hopp. Det slutgiltiga hoppet är att lösa konflikten mellan Israel och palestinierna, men innan detta sker hoppas man på att EU kan skapa en handfast struktur som befrämjar ekonomisk utveckling och demokratiska reformer.- Vad vi i Libanons civilsamhälle begär av Europa i ett första skede är att ni helt enkelt finns här, att ni är närvarande med era ögon och röster. När vi 2005 hade våra första fria parlamentariska val på trettio år, så var ni här. När det nu är dags att välja ny president hoppas och ber vi att ni åter kommer att vara på plats. Inte för att stödja Mallat som kandidat - det skulle krossa mina chanser - utan för att stödja fri debatt och sann demokrati.Men, kan jag inte låta bli att fråga, hur ser han på möjligheten att förverkliga denna dröm om han tar av sig sin visionära politiska hatt och sätter på den kritiskt akademiska?Mallat skrockar och tillstår att han i denna kapacitet nog är en aning mer pessimistisk.- Bortom den positiva dimensionen - Prodis ”politics of proximity” - ser jag flera negativa dimensioner. Den amerikanska närvaron: Israel vill inte släppa in EU så länge som man kan förlita sig på USA:s makt. Vidare EU:s inre kris efter folkomröstningarna om konstitutionsförslaget i Frankrike och Holland, även om det nya fördraget som förhandlades fram under Merkel sommaren 2007 inger ett visst förnyat hopp i detta avseende. Och slutligen den extremism som växt sig fast i den muslimska världen och som tagit sig våldsamma uttryck också i Europa.Vilken roll spelar arabisk nationalism och speciellt valet av våld som politisk metod? Du nämnde tidigare att dina ledstjärnor var mänskliga rättigheter och ickevåld. Jag har ofta undrat varför man i Palestina inte valt ickevåldet som strategi. Gandhi lärde ju världen att ickevåld fungerar bäst just i kampen mot en demokrati - likt Israel - snarare än i kampen mot mer skoningslösa auktoritära regimer. Detta känns, tragiskt, som en ”road not taken”.- Detta är en svår och ytterst allvarlig fråga. Jag har själv pläderat för en sådan strategi. Men Gandhi är tyvärr ett undantag i de nationella befrielserörelsernas historia. Mer typiskt och relevant för arabernas kamp var det fruktansvärda frihetskriget i Algeriet där hundratusentals människor dog. Gandhi var exceptionell - och jag kan inte mäta mig med honom även om jag ser honom som en stor inspiration. Han och Mandela. Men hur många Gandhi och Mandela kan vi hoppas på? Och inte ens Mandela frånsvor sig helt våldet som politiskt instrument.Jag undrar om Mallat tror att amerikanerna och de som stödde deras intervention i Irak har underskattat nationalismen som en politisk kraft. De flesta människor vill trots allt inte att deras land ska ockuperas, även om det sker i demokratins och de mänskliga rättigheternas namn. Detta var en läxa som kanske borde ha lärts definitivt efter Vietnamkriget. Speciellt gäller detta de så kallade liberala hökarna som ju inte vara drivna av hänsyn till rent nationella intressen utan just ville främja mänskliga rättigheter. Har ett tragiskt offer för det katastrofala Irakkriget blivit den offensiva kampen för mänskliga rättigheter?- Jag tror att jag underskattade den nationalistiska dimensionen. Visserligen var jag mot invasionen även om jag var för Saddams fall. Och när väl invasionen var ett faktum ville jag att den skulle avslutas så snart som möjligt. Men icke desto mindre förstod jag inte hur starkt och djupt det nationalistiska motståndet skulle bli. Med tanke på hur fel jag och många andra hade i frågan om det nationalistiska gensvaret tvekar jag att sia om framtiden nu.

Till toppenMALLAT NOTERAR SAMTIDIGT att även om Irakkriget visar på problemen med militära interventioner så kvarstår frågan ändå om vad vi kan och bör göra i fall som Rwanda, Darfur och Zimbabwe.Renodlad passivitet kan inte vara vårt enda alternativ.Någon form av blandning av militära hot och löften om hjälp inom ramen för en multilateral aktion måste kunna legitimeras.- För mig är dock det viktigaste att vi når fram till en framgångsberättelse som kan tjäna som exempel i Mellanöstern. Än så länge finns inget sådant exempel även om Libanon i någon mån var på väg att bli ett sådant under ett par månaders tid. Vi behöver mer, något som är varaktigt, som Spanien och Portugal efter diktaturernas fall och inträdet i EU. De mest troliga kandidaterna i min del av världen är Marocko och Libanon. Libanon med dess blygsamma men ändock konkreta erfarenhet av ickevåld. Åtminstone om vi får en hedervärd, kraftfull och demokratiskt vald president.

LARS TRÄGÅRDH
Lars Trägårdh är historiker och samhällsforskare.

Till toppenAxess Magasin     Copyright 2007 © Axess Publishing AB.Alla rättigheter reserverade.
 

 

Bush, Wolfowitz, Mortimer, Bayyati et les autres

October 6th, 2007

Diversification promised, diversification delivered. Un peu de francais fera plaisir a certains, en tout cas j’aime cette langue et son expression. On me pardonnera l’absence d’accents, ces blogs sont tres peu sympathiques a tout ce qui n’est pas anglais.

Voici donc une adresse pas comme les autres,

http://www.law.utah.edu/media/show-media.asp?MediaID=142

d’une part, elle met a la disposition du grand public des communications a l’origine restreintes a un groupe exceptionnel, le National Advisory Council de l’Universite de Utah — convie par invitation tres speciale du president. Dans la forme donc, elle prefigure un developpement interessant dans la democratisation du discours politique, qui permettra avant longtemps dans une societe libre avancee d’assister a une reunion de chefs d’Etat, par exemple, ou un conseil des ministres, en direct et sans intermediaire.

De l’autre, du point de vue de la substance, elle permet a chacun d’apprecier les ’secrets’ de ma rencontre avec M Wolfowitz dans son bureau du Departement de la Defense le 5 mars 2003, donc dix jours avant la guerre, et la tentative conjointe d’inflechir la guerre imminente par une resolution du Conseil de Securite qui aurait ccompagne la possibilite maintenant confirmee d’un exil de Saddam Hussein.

Pour l’avenir, ceux qui auront la patience d’ecouter l’adresse jusqu’a la fin verront comment je vois deux initiatives, au Liban et en Irak, dans les semaines qui viennent. Qui sait, peut-etre voudront-ils en etre…

On Palestinians in Lebanon

October 5th, 2007

There is too much English on this blog, but it’s as simple as this: I am slow at typing Arabic, and I have to rely on my assistants in Beirut. But I will try diversifying, here are a few reflections in Arabic on the continuing Palestinian tragedy in Lebanon.

http://mallatforpresident.com/events/event.php?id=355

or on the excellent news site directed by Rabih Haber in Beirut

http://www.lebanonfiles.com/news_desc.php?id=19113

Policy towards Hizbullah

October 5th, 2007

An open letter on the eve of Hasan Nasrallah’s speech

As Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah prepares his speech for tomorrow, here is what I would like to hear him tell me and our fellow Lebanese, together with a few frankly expressed truths as a candidate to the Lebanese presidency. Owing to Hizbullah’s deliberate ignorance of a difficult and costly candidacy over the past two years, I still hope that my sacrifices and commitments for the people of Iraq and Lebanon, especially the Shi’is amongst them, are recognised for their genuine character and exceptional intensity.

First, I’d like to stop hearing threats of the type all too current in his speeches, most notoriously the one expressed on 12 July 2006, in which he warned those Lebanese, like me, who disagree with his grave breach of international law, to put up or shut up. Of course I did not shut up, and people remember my severe and empathic debate with a senior Hizbullah representative on national television. All Lebanese should be able to say exactly what they think about Hizbullah, positively or negatively, without standing accused of either lack of statesmanship or patriotic sellout.

Second, I would like him to desist from boasting victory in the war he started against Israel last year.  I am still upset with those across the Arab world who considered that terrible blunder committed on July 12, which cost us 1200 deaths and a million refugees, to be a victory. God never rejoices in such all too human events, so “divine” is a preposterous adjective in any context like this.

For my part, I will not shy from telling openly to the Israeli government that its declared policy of targeted assassinations against our Hizbullah leadership, same as the one brutally carried out in Palestine, is not acceptable, that the brutal war conducted last year was unwarranted, and that if there is a chance to bring those responsible for it under international law to trial, I will support it. “All people are equal like the comb’s teeth,” as the Prophetic saying foes, and impunity is unacceptable, whether it’s Sharon, Qaddafi, or Asad, who commits a massive international crime.

Third, to augment his confidence in this commitment of mine,– and I agree he is also a man of commitment, — I’d like to remind him that I was first to break the taboo of Hizbullah’s participation in government which had been imposed by the tacit agreement of Syria and the US government for fifteen years previous. But not with Hizbullah bringing its weapons to the table of governmental discussion as it has so far done. My offer stands. I would like to see him in the next government, but only after he makes peace with a number of issues: one is his readiness to lay down his arms, in return for international, including Israeli assurances, that he and his fellow leaders will not need to carry on their life in hiding. Considering the rapprochement I effected between Walid Jumblatt and Paul Wolfowitz despite Jumblatt’s infamous “virus speech”, I believe I can deliver. This is different, more difficult, but I have already expressed it in public, as I chaired in New York last June a roundtable in which the Israeli ambassador to the UN was speaking, together with my distinguished colleagues Joschka Fischer and Daniel Kurtzer.

I do not think that the Hizbullah leadership has anything to do with the assassination of our fellow Lebanese. But the leadership has not cooperated enough, as far as I can see, with the investigation, and I am certain that its vast security capabilities would unveil considerable mystery still shrouding the carrying out of twenty massive bombing operations and counting. Nor have I heard Hizbullah partake in the mourning of Charles Chikhani or Walid Eido, and I think this is unacceptable. I devoted a good part of my scholarly life to vindicating the immense legacy of Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr and his sister: although I love Najaf as a world-class place of learning, I am not a follower of Sadr or Bint al-Huda. I expect similar, genuine revulsion and empathy from Hizbullah and its followers when fellow Lebanese are cowardly assassinated. I do not see this empathy, and I cannot hear it. We will not succeed in building a country where I as non Shi’i remain indifferent to the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, nor will the country be safe if Hizbullah’s followers distribute candy in the streets when a political opponent in Lebanon is assassinated. Sayyed Nawaf Musawi knows how angry I was on the reported joy in the Southern Suburbs when Gebran Tueni was killed. I would like to see the followers of Hizbullah genuinely angry at the brutal death of Lebanese innocents, and it is up to the leadership to reverse this indifference or sometimes muted joy.

I deliberately chose, and I associate myself with the demand of the Maronite bishops, to end the endless, forceful occupation of a large part of Central Beirut, by Hizbullah and Aounist apparatchiks. They are preventing citizens from getting to their work, and brandishing the sword of Damocles over the head of MPs on the other side.   This is not acceptable in a free country.

I’d like to think of Sayyed Nasrallah, soon after my new presidency, taking part jointly and proudly in a Lebanese delegation to momentous world conferences for Middle East peace. I will even work to see him or his colleagues in New York before then, indeed as we seek to overcome the constitutional deadlock occasioned by Emile Lahoud’s coerced extension. A coerced extension effected and maintained with Hizbullah’s support, I am sorry to say.

In short, no more thundering as we have been made used to.  We want to hear Hasan Nasrallah produce a message of peace, and a message of friendship across the Lebanese political barrier.

 

Kristof in the NY Times. No more undemocratic envoys to Lebanon

October 2nd, 2007

I just discovered this in a random internet search. Rather moving. I will send Mr Kristof my Oeuvres Completes. Now here is the upshot for Lebanon:

Recently in Beirut, I asked specifically that the Arab League spare us envoys of the type ‘President of Sudan emissary’. I am serious about this, and i will insist with our Prime Minister that he decline receiving Bashir’s emissary. No more Arab dictatorships mediating the Lebanese crisis, it’s hard enough to stomach the French and US emissaries.

New York Times

January 25, 2006, 8:17 pm

Chibli Mallat for President!

By Nicholas D. Kristof

Chibli Mallat is running for president of Lebanon, and I support him all the way. Mallat is a lawyer, professor and activist who is exactly the new kind of leader that the Arab world needs.I’ve occasionally in my blog and column complained that the Arab and Muslim worlds have, with very few exceptions, ignored the greatest brutality directed at Muslims in the world today — the slaughter in Darfur. One of those few exceptions has been Chibli Mallat. He has vigorously denounced the slaughter, saying that if Arabs are going to protest brutality against Palestinians they must do the same against the people of Darfur.This is one classy guy. Here’s the top of an aricle about him by Rami Khoury in the Daily Star of Beirut:

“The respected lawyer, professor and democracy activist Chibli Mallat is running for president of Lebanon, at a time when no presidential election has been officially declared, in a system in which Parliament chooses the president. Succeed or not, his candidacy is worthy because he is challenging, and may help to change, two core enigmas of the modern Arab world and its bizarre political order: why executive power remains in the hands of the same person for many years; and why individual citizens feel helpless and angry, but do not try seriously to change their unsatisfactory autocratic systems.

Mallat’s candidacy provides a rare example of how individuals can instigate change by demanding that those who wield power should be held accountable to the law. It also affirms the novel idea that any Arab citizen can aspire to become president through democratic political action and personal initiative.

This is not new ground for Mallat, who has a track record in challenging political impunity by leaders throughout the Middle East. He actively and publicly campaigned for years against the practices of leaders like Moammar Gadhafi in Libya and Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

He was one of a handful of lawyers who took the daring step in June 2001 of filing a criminal complaint in a Belgian court on behalf of 28 witnesses and survivors of the 1982 massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in Beirut, which resulted in the brutal death of between 700 and several thousand Palestinian civilians. The suit charged Israel’s Ariel Sharon and Amos Yaron, and several members of a Lebanese Christian militia, with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Mallat and colleagues had made their point on the global stage: political impunity and wanton killing of any people, by any people, was unacceptable and had to be ended.”

Digital weekend- preparing for the UN

October 1st, 2007

I had two exceptional occasions, on Friday and Saturday, to develop some of the ideas relating to Lebanon and the UN, and more generally the input needed worldwide to get the Middle East, including Lebanon and Iraq, right….

The first occasion was an invitation by the international law journal students on Friday afternoon, which was webcast live. The second occasion was the great privilege of addressing the University of Utah’s National Advisory Council, with Dean Hiram Chodosh and President Michael Young.

Both addresses will be made available on the internet this week, and my campaign will summarize their key points in a press release tomorrow. The addresses will stand in good order with the attack on Kouchner and the UN by Speaker Berri on Friday, with Walid Joumblatt’s remarkable letter to world leaders, and with the meeting announced for Thursday between MP Hariri and President Bush.

The Pais minutes

September 27th, 2007

Iraq sounds so far away from Lebanon (it’s not), and this may appear as a distraction. But I can’t resist reacting to the extraordinary minutes just published in El Pais of a meeting between then Spanish Prime Minister Aznar and President Bush on 22 Feb. 2003 (the war started on March 15, here are the minutes in English).

Being one, I like outsiders. Between McCain and Bush, I preferred McCain. Between H. Clinton and Obama, I prefer Obama. Between Obama and whoever will stand against him amongst the Republicans, i prefer Obama. Incoherent, inconsistent, and so irresponsible ? I will need to prove to you otherwise, but this has to wait for my treatise on the shape of post-modern, including post-party politics. I am committed to it if i do not get elected president.

Now Bush. I met him that one brief time, so not enough to give a personal impression. On the record I can read, I believe, like Jimmy Carter [scroll down for picture] on human rights as world agenda, Bush will make his mark as a committed democrat in world affairs, who may have changed 200 years of US foreign policy if we succeed in Lebanon, and through Lebanon, in the Middle East, to put non-violence and justice as the cornerstones of politics.

Now here are some of the Pais minutes, for which a brief introduction. On or around the early afternoon of a late December 2002 lunch at Al Dente’s Restaurant in Beirut , Roland Tomb, Selim Mouzannar, Elias Khoury, and I were having coffee after a conversation which centered of course on Iraq. I can’t remember if Michael Young was with us. In any case, I wanted something to be done, and since we all agreed that Saddam Hussein was a dictator, that he should go, and that we should prevent the war and the occupation of Iraq, I suggested that Elias draft a text. With his extraordinary talent, in five minutes was sculpted a two paragraph text of the most remarkable non-event in my life: the avoidance of war and the beginning of democracy in Iraq and the rest of the region.

There is a larger context to this Democratic Iraq Initiative, which I had started with Pierre Schori, Harold Koh, Edward Mortimer, and Ahmad Chalabi the previous summer, and an extraordinary meeting in Paul Wolfowitz’ office on March 5, two weeks after the Pais minutes. This requires a long exparte, meanwhile here are the important excerpts of the minutes. PB stands for president Bush, PA for president [of the Council of Ministers, from the excellent translation provided in the site above] Aznar:

PB. Saddam Husein will not change and will keep on playing games. The time has come to get rid of him. That’s the way it is. For my part, I will try, from now on, to use the most subtle rhetoric possible, while we seel approval of the resolution. If somebody vetoes it [Russia, China and France, alongside the US and UK, have veto power as permanent members of the Security Council], we will go [into Iraq?]. Saddam Hussein is not disarming. We must get him right now. We have shown an incredible degree of patience until now. There are two weeks left. In two weeks’ time we will be militarily ready. I believe that we will obtain the second resolution. In the Security Council we have the three Africans [Cameroon, Angola and Guinea], and also the Chileans, the Mexicans. I will speak with all of them, also with Putin, naturally. We will be in Baghdad at the end of March. There is a 15% possibility [sic] that Saddam Hussein will be dead or gone by then. But those possibilities do not exist before we have shown our resolution. The Egyptians are speaking with Saddam Hussein. He seems to have indicated that he would be prepared to go into exile if he were allowed to take one [US] billion dollars and all the information he wanted on weapons of mass destruction. [Muammar] Gadhafi has told Berlusconi that Saddam Hussein wants to leave. Mubarak is telling us that in those circumstances there are many possibilities [sic] of him being assassinated. PB. Sadam Husein no cambiará y seguirá jugando. Ha llegado el momento de deshacerse de él. Es así. Yo, por mi parte, procuraré a partir de ahora utilizar una retórica lo más sutil posible, mientras buscamos la aprobación de la resolución. Si alguien veta [Rusia, China y Francia poseen junto a EE UU y Reino Unido derecho a veto en el Consejo de Seguridad en su calidad de miembros permanentes], nosotros iremos. Sadam Hussein no se está desarmando. Le tenemos que coger ahora mismo. Hemos mostrado un grado increíble de paciencia hasta ahora. Quedan dos semanas. En dos semanas estaremos militarmente listos. Creo que conseguiremos la segunda resolución. En el Consejo de Seguridad tenemos a los tres africanos [Camerún, Angola y Guinea], a los chilenos, a los mexicanos. Hablaré con todos ellos, también con Putin, naturalmente. Estaremos en Bagdad a finales de marzo. Existe un 15% de posibilidades de que en ese momento Sadam Hussein esté muerto o se haya ido. Pero esas posibilidades no existen antes de que hayamos mostrado nuestra resolución. Los egipcios están hablando con Sadam Hussein. Parece que ha indicado que estaría dispuesto a exiliarse si le dejaran llevarse 1.000 millones de dólares y toda la información que quisiera sobre armas de destrucción masiva. [Muammar El] Gaddafi le ha dicho a Berlusconi que Sadam Hussein quiere irse. Mubarak nos dice que en esas circunstancias existen muchas posibilidades de que sea asesinado.
We would like to act with a UN mandate. If we act militarily we will do it with high accuracy and highly focused goals. We will decimate the loyal troops and the regular army will quickly know what it’s all about. We have sent a very clear message to Saddam Hussein’s generals: we will treat them like war criminals. We know they have accumulated an enormous amount of dynamite to blow up the bridges and other infrastructure and also the oil wells. We expect to occupy those wells soon. The Saudis would also help us bring the oil to market if necessary. We are developing a very strong package of humanitarian aid. We can win without destruction. We are already planning the post-Saddam Iraq, and I believe that is a good basis for a better future. Iraq has a good bureaucracy and a relatively strong civil society. It could be organized into a federation. Meanwhile we are doing everyhting possible to attend to all the political needs of our friends and allies. Nos gustaría actuar con el mandato de las Naciones Unidas. Si actuamos militarmente lo haremos con una gran precisión y focalizando mucho nuestros objetivos. Diezmaremos a las tropas leales y el ejército regular rápidamente sabrá de lo que se trata. Hemos hecho llegar un mensaje muy claro a los generales de Sadam Hussein: los trataremos como criminales de guerra. Sabemos que han acumulado una enorme cantidad de dinamita para hacer volar los puentes y otras infraestructuras y hacer saltar por los aires los pozos petrolíferos. Tenemos previsto ocupar esos pozos muy pronto. También los saudíes nos ayudarían a poner en el mercado el petróleo que fuese necesario. Estamos desarrollando un paquete de ayuda humanitaria muy fuerte. Podemos ganar sin destrucción. Estamos planteando ya el Irak post Sadam, y creo que hay buenas bases para un futuro mejor. Irak tiene una buena burocracia y una sociedad civil relativamente fuerte. Se podría organizar en una federación. Mientras tanto estamos haciendo todo lo posible para atender las necesidades políticas de nuestros amigos y aliados.

PA. Is it true that there is a chance Saddam Hussein will go into exile? PA. ¿Es cierto que existe alguna posibilidad de que Sadam Hussein se exilie?
PB. Yes, that possibility exists. Even of him being assassinated. PB. Sí, existe esa posibilidad. Incluso de que sea asesinado.
PA. Exile with some guarantees? PA. ¿Exilio con alguna garantía?
PB. No guarantee. He is a thief, a terrorist, a war criminal. Compared with Saddam, Milosevic would be Mother Teresa. When we go in we are going to discover many more crimes and we will take him to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Saddam Hussein thinks that he has already gotten away. He thinks that France and Germany have stopped the trial for [the crimes he’s responsible for]. He also believes that last week’s demonstrations [Saturday February 15] protect him. And he thinks that I am very weakened. But the people around him know that things are different. They know that his future is in exile or in a coffin. For that reason it is so important to keep up the pressure on him. Gadhafi is telling us indirectly that this is the thin that can finish him. The only strategy of Saddam Hussein is to delay, delay and delay. PB. Ninguna garantía. Es un ladrón, un terrorista, un criminal de guerra. Comparado con Sadam, Milosevic sería una Madre Teresa. Cuando entremos vamos a descubrir muchos más crímenes y le llevaremos al Tribunal Internacional de Justicia de La Haya. Sadam Hussein cree que ya se ha escapado. Cree que Francia y Alemania han detenido el proceso de sus responsabilidades. Cree también que las manifestaciones de la semana pasada [sábado 15 de febrero] le protegen. Y cree que yo estoy muy debilitado. Pero la gente de su entorno sabe que las cosas son de otra manera. Saben que su futuro está en el exilio o en un ataúd. Por eso es tan importante mantener la presión sobre él. Gaddafi nos dice indirectamente que eso es lo único que puede acabar con él. La única estrategia de Sadam Hussein es la de retrasar, retrasar y retrasar.
PA. In fact the greatest success would be to win the game without firing a single shot, and going into Bagdad. PA. En realidad el mayor éxito sería ganar la partida sin disparar un solo tiro y entrando en Bagdad.
PB. For me it would be the perfect solution. I do not want the war. I know what wars are. I know the destruction and the death that bring with them. I am the one that has to comfort the mothers and widows of the dead. By all means, for us that would be the best solution. In addition, it would save us 50 [US] billion dollars. PB. Para mí sería la solución perfecta. Yo no quiero la guerra. Sé lo que son las guerras. Sé la destrucción y la muerte que traen consigo. Yo soy el que tiene que consolar a las madres y a las viudas de los muertos. Por supuesto, para nosotros esa sería la mejor solución. Además, nos ahorraría 50.000 millones de dólares.

 

PMA. Next Wednesday [16th february, THIS CAN’T BE RIGHT, SINCE THE MTG WAS 22 FEB. CM] I will meet with Chirac. The resolution already will have begun to circulate. PA. El próximo miércoles [16 de febrero] me veo con Chirac. La resolución ya habrá comenzado a circular.
PB. I think that’s fine. Chirac knows the reality [of the situation] perfectly. Their intelligence services have explained it to him. The Arabs are transmitting a very clear message to Chirac: Saddam Hussein must go. The problem is that Chirac sees himself as Mister Arab and in fact he is making their life impossible. But I do not want to have any rivalry with Chirac. We have different points of view, but I would like that to be all. Give him my best regards. Really! The less rivalry he feels between us the better for all. PB. Me parece muy bien. Chirac conoce perfectamente la realidad. Sus servicios de inteligencia se lo han explicado. Los árabes le están transmitiendo a Chirac un mensaje muy claro: Sadam Hussein debe irse. El problema es que Chirac se cree Mister Arab y en realidad les está haciendo la vida imposible. Pero yo no quiero tener ninguna rivalidad con Chirac. Tenemos puntos de vista diferentes, pero yo quisiera que eso fuera todo. Dale los mejores recuerdos de mi parte. ¡De verdad! Cuanto menos rivalidad sienta él que existe entre nosotros será mejor para todos.

PA. Is it true that there is a chance Saddam Hussein will go into exile? PA. ¿Es cierto que existe alguna posibilidad de que Sadam Hussein se exilie?
PB. Yes, that possibility exists. Even of him being assassinated. PB. Sí, existe esa posibilidad. Incluso de que sea asesinado.
PA. Exile with some guarantees? PA. ¿Exilio con alguna garantía?
PB. No guarantee. He is a thief, a terrorist, a war criminal. Compared with Saddam, Milosevic would be Mother Teresa. When we go in we are going to discover many more crimes and we will take him to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Saddam Hussein thinks that he has already gotten away. He thinks that France and Germany have stopped the trial for [the crimes he’s responsible for]. He also believes that last week’s demonstrations [Saturday February 15] protect him. And he thinks that I am very weakened. But the people around him know that things are different. They know that his future is in exile or in a coffin. For that reason it is so important to keep up the pressure on him. Gadhafi is telling us indirectly that this is the thin that can finish him. The only strategy of Saddam Hussein is to delay, delay and delay. PB. Ninguna garantía. Es un ladrón, un terrorista, un criminal de guerra. Comparado con Sadam, Milosevic sería una Madre Teresa. Cuando entremos vamos a descubrir muchos más crímenes y le llevaremos al Tribunal Internacional de Justicia de La Haya. Sadam Hussein cree que ya se ha escapado. Cree que Francia y Alemania han detenido el proceso de sus responsabilidades. Cree también que las manifestaciones de la semana pasada [sábado 15 de febrero] le protegen. Y cree que yo estoy muy debilitado. Pero la gente de su entorno sabe que las cosas son de otra manera. Saben que su futuro está en el exilio o en un ataúd. Por eso es tan importante mantener la presión sobre él. Gaddafi nos dice indirectamente que eso es lo único que puede acabar con él. La única estrategia de Sadam Hussein es la de retrasar, retrasar y retrasar.
PA. In fact the greatest success would be to win the game without firing a single shot, and going into Bagdad. PA. En realidad el mayor éxito sería ganar la partida sin disparar un solo tiro y entrando en Bagdad.
PB. For me it would be the perfect solution. I do not want the war. I know what wars are. I know the destruction and the death that bring with them. I am the one that has to comfort the mothers and widows of the dead. By all means, for us that would be the best solution. In addition, it would save us 50 [US] billion dollars. PB. Para mí sería la solución perfecta. Yo no quiero la guerra. Sé lo que son las guerras. Sé la destrucción y la muerte que traen consigo. Yo soy el que tiene que consolar a las madres y a las viudas de los muertos. Por supuesto, para nosotros esa sería la mejor solución. Además, nos ahorraría 50.000 millones de dólares.

PA. The only thing which worries me about you is your optimism. PA. Lo único que me preocupa de ti es tu optimismo.
PB. I am optimistic because I think I am right. I am at peace with myself. It is our lot to face up to a serious threat against peace. It really irritates me to contemplate the insensitivity of Europeans for the suffering that Saddam Hussein inflicts on the Iraqis. Perhaps it is because he is brown, far away and Muslim, many Europeans think there’s no problem with him. I will not forget what once Solana told me: that this is why the Americans think that Europeans are anti-semitic and incapable of facing up to their responsibilities. That defensive attitude is terrible. I must admit that with Kofi Annan I have great relations. PB. Estoy optimista porque creo que estoy en lo cierto. Estoy en paz conmigo mismo. Nos ha correspondido hacer frente a una seria amenaza contra la paz. Me irrita muchísimo contemplar la insensibilidad de los europeos sobre los sufrimientos que Sadam Hussein inflige a los iraquíes. Quizá porque es